report-print-pdf
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles a
logo_pathvariable that is interpolated directly into an<img>source. In environments using mPDF, this can be exploited to perform Local File Inclusion (LFI) or Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if the path is not strictly validated. Additionally, the JavaScriptopenReportPrintfunction performs afetchwithcredentials: "include"to an arbitrary URL, which could lead to session or credential leakage if the URL is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its report generation workflow (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via the
$metaarray,$tableHtml, and$summaryHtmlparameters in theReportHtmlTemplateclass. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent or the rendering engine to isolate untrusted data from the template structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates code capable of file system access (for logos) and dynamic HTML rendering in both PHP and browser contexts.
- Sanitization: While some metadata fields use
htmlspecialchars, the primary content blocks ($tableHtmland$summaryHtml) are interpolated raw into the HTML output, allowing for arbitrary content injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided JavaScript helper uses
document.write(html)to render content fetched from a remote source. This pattern is dangerous as it allows for the execution of arbitrary scripts (XSS) if the source HTML contains malicious<script>tags or other executable content.
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