check-prd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external PRD documents which may contain indirect prompt injection attempts intended to manipulate the agent's review results.
- Ingestion points: External document content is ingested via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable or direct user input as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters to separate untrusted user content from the core review logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill is scoped to text analysis and report generation; it does not request permissions for dangerous tools such as network access or arbitrary file system writes during the analysis process.
- Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of the input text is mentioned in the logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The development script
scripts/validate.pyutilizessubprocess.runto execute a local Python script (scripts/build.py) as part of its build and validation workflow. - Evidence:
subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(BUILD_SCRIPT)], cwd=ROOT, check=True)inscripts/validate.py. - Context: This execution is used solely for artifact generation and structural validation during the development phase and is not invoked during the agent's runtime execution of the PRD review tasks.
Audit Metadata