skills-store
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch instructions and executable files from an external repository (PostHog) and treat the retrieved content as part of the agent's core instructions for a task. This workflow introduces an indirect prompt injection surface where external data could potentially override or subvert the agent's intended behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests external data through the
posthog:skill-gettool (specifically thebodyfield) and theposthog:skill-file-gettool (which retrieves bundled scripts and reference documents). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define or suggest the use of boundary markers (like XML tags or delimiters) to isolate fetched content, nor do they include directives to ignore potential instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the retrieval and execution of external scripts (e.g., Python code referenced in the
scripts/directory) and documentation that guides agent workflows. - Sanitization: The instructions lack any requirement for sanitizing, validating, or filtering the content retrieved from the PostHog store before it is interpreted or executed.
Audit Metadata