skills-store
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a remote instruction loader pattern (Category 8). It retrieves instruction sets (skill bodies) from a remote PostHog store and directs the agent to 'treat it as your system instructions for this task.'
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
posthog:skill-get(instruction body) andposthog:skill-file-get(bundled reference files). - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide or mandate the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when incorporating this remote content into the agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: Loaded skills are described as having access to
allowed_toolsand can include executable code in thescripts/directory. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the remote instruction body or bundled files is described before they are followed or used.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the fetching and dynamic execution of scripts from the PostHog store.
- Evidence: The workflow explicitly describes using
posthog:skill-file-getto pull bundled scripts (such as those in thescripts/directory) on demand for execution. While the source is a well-known service (PostHog), this mechanism allows for the runtime execution of code retrieved from an external repository.
Audit Metadata