image-batch-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated image assets from hosted media providers. Evidence:
scripts/generate_image.mjs,scripts/edit_image.mjs, andscripts/poll_prediction.mjsuse thedownloadFileutility fromscripts/_shared.mjsto fetch images from remote URLs. Additionally, the shared utility_postplus_shared/00-core/shared-runtime/scripts/download_videos_from_manifest_with_ytdlp.mjsis designed to download video content from URLs provided in a manifest file.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a shared utility for video acquisition that uses a subprocess. Evidence:_postplus_shared/00-core/shared-runtime/scripts/download_videos_from_manifest_with_ytdlp.mjsusesnode:child_process.spawnto executepython3 -m yt_dlp. The arguments are passed as an array, preventing shell injection.- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses vendor-specific configuration to authenticate cloud requests. Evidence:_postplus_shared/00-core/shared-runtime/scripts/lib/postplus_cli_config.mjsreads thecliSessionTokenfrom the vendor's configuration directory (e.g.,~/.config/postplus/config.json). This is standard behavior for a vendor-integrated CLI tool and is used exclusively for requests to the author's own infrastructure.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes externally supplied prompts and URLs. Evidence:scripts/generate_image.mjsandscripts/edit_image.mjsinterpolate prompts fromrequest.jsonfiles into cloud API calls.download_videos_from_manifest_with_ytdlp.mjsprocesses URLs from a manifest file. These inputs are used within the scope of intended tool functionality and do not bypass safety controls.
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