trace-change-why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/find-session.shis vulnerable to argument injection. The variable$FILE_PATTERNis passed directly togrepandrgwithout the--flag terminator. A file pattern starting with a hyphen could be interpreted as a command-line option, potentially allowing an attacker to manipulate the search tool's behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by design. It retrieves and analyzes past session logs located in
~/.claude/projects/. These logs contain historical conversation data that may include content from untrusted external sources encountered in previous sessions. Re-injecting this data into the current context without sanitization could lead the agent to execute malicious instructions embedded in the history. - Ingestion points: Reads from
.jsonlsession transcript files using shell scripts and file-reading tools. - Boundary markers: None identified. The skill does not provide the agent with specific delimiters or instructions to treat the log content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution (
bash), version control tools (git), and file system access. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the session log content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata