autoresearch-fleet
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
launch.shscript dynamically generates a bash script (orchestrator.sh) at runtime and saves it to the fleet root before execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator script constructs and executes shell commands for AI agents using
bash -cin the main loop of theorchestrator.shscript. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a user-provided
eval_command(defined infleet.json) within a loop to measure project metrics, which can include arbitrary shell commands. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to perform an autonomous 'research' loop which involves modifying local source code and executing it via the
eval_commandto optimize performance metrics. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages global state by reading and writing to
~/.claude/fleet-registry.json, accessing the user's home directory via shell operations inlib/registry.sh. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent's instructions include reading
results.tsv, which contains output and descriptions from previous iterations of the agent. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where adversarial content in one iteration could manipulate the agent's behavior in subsequent iterations. - Ingestion points:
results.tsv(read by both the orchestrator prompt builder and the agent). - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is not instructed to treat previous results as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is provided with
Bash,Read,Write, andGlobtools, and nested agents are granted shell access. - Sanitization: Absent; descriptions generated by the agent are recorded in the TSV and read back without validation.
Audit Metadata