dag-fleet
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration scripts
launch.sh,relaunch-worker.sh, andkill.shutilize unquoted heredocs (<<EOF) to generate JSON status files. This allows for shell command expansion of variables like${_task}and${WORKER_TASK}. If these fields infleet.jsoncontain shell metacharacters like$(...), the commands will be executed with the privileges of the user running the orchestrator.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator dynamically generates and executes shell scripts (.run.sh) to manage worker processes. While some input validation is present, the dynamic assembly of these scripts via string concatenation inworker-spawn.shcreates a risk surface for injection if validation logic is circumvented.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the use of external binariescodexandpi(associated with pi.dev). These represent external tool dependencies that execute with host permissions, though they are standard for the skill's multi-provider purpose.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection through itsresearchworker type. \n - Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from the web when research workers utilize search and fetch tools.\n
- Boundary markers: Instructions are provided to workers for output directory isolation, but no technical markers prevent the processing of malicious instructions embedded in fetched data.\n
- Capability inventory: Depending on the worker type, sub-agents can execute bash commands, write to the filesystem, and perform network operations.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by worker agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata