add-telegram-swarm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces new instructions to the agent's environment via
CLAUDE.mdfiles. These instructions define how the lead agent should create and coordinate subagents, including specific message formatting and tool usage constraints. While functional, these act as persistent behavioral overrides. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation process requires the agent to modify multiple source files (
src/config.ts,src/telegram.ts,src/ipc.ts, etc.) and execute build/restart commands (npm run build,./container/build.sh,launchctl). These actions modify the host environment and application logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection surface detected in the Agent Swarm logic.
- Ingestion points: The
senderandtextparameters in thesend_messagetool withincontainer/agent-runner/src/ipc-mcp-stdio.tsingest data generated by subagents. - Boundary markers: Instructions in
CLAUDE.mdadvise agents on usage, but no programmatic sanitization or delimiters are applied to thesenderfield before processing. - Capability inventory: The ingested
senderstring is passed directly to the TelegramsetMyNameAPI call to rename a bot, and thetextis sent viasendMessage. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the
senderparameter before it is used in thesetMyNamefunction insrc/telegram.ts.
Audit Metadata