memory-management

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the execution of npx claude-recall setup --install, which modifies the local .claude/settings.json file to register automatic capture hooks. It also utilizes npx to manage skills via list, generate, and clean commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on an external Node.js package, claude-recall, executed via npx. This package is responsible for the underlying storage, retrieval, and skill generation logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a mechanism for indirect prompt injection. By directing the agent to 'ALWAYS load rules before acting' and 'ACT on loaded rules', any malicious content captured in the memory (e.g., from a processed file or crafted user input) can be converted into a persistent directive influencing future agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation transcripts and user prompts are ingested via hooks (correction-detector, memory-stop, precompact-preserve) and manual tool calls (store_memory).
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the stored memory content.
  • Capability inventory: Loaded rules are prioritized as the first action of every session and are instructed to inform filesystem exploration, code editing, and decision-making.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or validation of the text before it is stored or re-injected as a rule.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Skill Crystallization' feature dynamically writes new SKILL.md files to .claude/skills/auto-*/ based on accumulated conversation history. These files are automatically loaded as new skills by the platform, representing the dynamic generation of executable instructions from potentially untrusted data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 3, 2026, 10:37 AM