deploy

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from external data sources processed at runtime.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches plugin definitions from the rhdh-plugin-export-overlays repository and monitors PR comments for responses from the @rhdh-test-bot (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched YAML data or monitored bot comments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill employs powerful CLI tools including oc, kubectl, vault, and gh, which could be targeted if external input sources are compromised.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved content is performed before the agent processes or displays the data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes commands that handle high-privilege cluster administrator credentials.
  • The skill provides instructions to retrieve CLUSTER_ADMIN_USERNAME and CLUSTER_ADMIN_PASSWORD from HashiCorp Vault to perform authenticated operations on OpenShift clusters.
  • While it includes critical warnings to prevent secrets from appearing in tool output, the automated orchestration of these credentials by an AI agent remains a sensitive operation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads configuration data from vendor-owned external sources.
  • The skill uses curl to fetch plugin catalogs and package metadata from the redhat-developer/rhdh-plugin-export-overlays repository on GitHub. These resources are from the official vendor infrastructure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 11:29 AM