deploy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from external data sources processed at runtime.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches plugin definitions from the
rhdh-plugin-export-overlaysrepository and monitors PR comments for responses from the@rhdh-test-bot(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched YAML data or monitored bot comments.
- Capability inventory: The skill employs powerful CLI tools including
oc,kubectl,vault, andgh, which could be targeted if external input sources are compromised. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved content is performed before the agent processes or displays the data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes commands that handle high-privilege cluster administrator credentials.
- The skill provides instructions to retrieve
CLUSTER_ADMIN_USERNAMEandCLUSTER_ADMIN_PASSWORDfrom HashiCorp Vault to perform authenticated operations on OpenShift clusters. - While it includes critical warnings to prevent secrets from appearing in tool output, the automated orchestration of these credentials by an AI agent remains a sensitive operation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads configuration data from vendor-owned external sources.
- The skill uses
curlto fetch plugin catalogs and package metadata from theredhat-developer/rhdh-plugin-export-overlaysrepository on GitHub. These resources are from the official vendor infrastructure.
Audit Metadata