publish-placeholder-package
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using placeholders like
<package-name>and<code>that are replaced by user input. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the user provides malicious strings containing shell metacharacters. Evidence:npm view <package-name>@0.0.0 versionandnpm publish --otp <code>inSKILL.md.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates apackage.jsonfile using user-provided strings. Maliciously crafted input could escape the JSON structure to inject arbitrary package configuration, such as install scripts. Evidence:cat > package.jsonheredoc block inSKILL.md.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data to drive agent actions without sufficient boundaries or sanitization.\n - Ingestion points: User-supplied package name, repo directory, and OTP code in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; placeholders are interpolated directly into shell strings and file templates.\n
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
npm,mktemp,cat, andrm.\n - Sanitization: None; no validation or escaping is applied to user inputs before shell execution or file generation.
Audit Metadata