image-ai-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes user-provided text through the
--promptargument and interpolates it directly into the natural language request sent to the AI model inscripts/generate.py. This creates a surface for prompt injection where a user could potentially influence model behavior or bypass safety filters. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfrontmatter defines aninvokecommand that interpolates the{prompt}variable into a shell command:python3 {skill_path}/scripts/generate.py --prompt "{prompt}". This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the underlying platform does not properly escape shell metacharacters in the user-supplied prompt string. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script makes network requests to
https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completionsto generate images. This is a legitimate use of a well-known AI service for the skill's primary function. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface Detection:
- Ingestion points: User-supplied strings via the
--promptargument and content from JSON files processed via the--batchflag inscripts/generate.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompt is concatenated directly into the API request payload without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to arbitrary local paths (via
--output) and perform network operations (OpenRouter API). - Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or filtering is performed on the input strings before they are sent to the model or processed by the script.
Audit Metadata