instagram-publisher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local files specified by the
--imagesargument and uploads their content (Base64 encoded) to the imgBB API (api.imgbb.com). While this is the primary function of the skill, it creates a mechanism where any file accessible to the agent could be uploaded to a public image hosting service if the file path is manipulated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the local environment and user-provided captions without strict sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: The
--images(file paths) and--caption(text) arguments inscripts/publish.jsare derived from files in thesquads/{squad}/output/images/directory and content drafts. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the processed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
fs.readFileSyncfor local file access andfetchfor outbound network requests to external APIs (imgBB and Facebook Graph API). - Sanitization: There is no validation or escaping of the
captiontext or verification that theimagespaths remain within the intended directory before being processed by the script. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the script path defined in the YAML frontmatter (
scripts/publish.js) and the path provided in the workflow instructions (squads/{squad}/tools/publish.js). This inconsistency could lead to the execution of unintended files or configuration errors.
Audit Metadata