gmail-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data (email bodies and newsletter content) that is then processed by the agent for categorization and summarization.
- Ingestion points: Raw email content is fetched via
gws gmail users messages getand processed byscripts/extract_newsletter.pybefore being presented to the agent context. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters (like XML tags or 'ignore' prefixes) defined in the workflow to separate the email content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
gws(Google Workspace CLI) and localized scripts. It can modify account state by marking emails as read. - Sanitization: The
extract_newsletter.pyscript performs basic HTML stripping and character limiting but does not sanitize for embedded instructions that could attempt to manipulate the agent's output or actions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local shell commands (
gws,bash,python) to interact with the Gmail API. While these are part of the intended functionality, they use string-interpolated JSON parameters (--paramsand--json) which could be a target for injection if the email IDs or inputs were maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata