feishu-cli-import

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's execution flow includes a Python one-liner (python3 -c "d=open('<file.md>','rb').read(); ...") used to validate UTF-8 encoding. This command uses string interpolation of the file path, which allows for arbitrary code execution if the path contains single quotes or other shell-sensitive characters (e.g., ''); import os; os.system('id'); #.md').
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions marked as 'CRITICAL' mandate that the agent immediately grant full_access and transfer document ownership to a hardcoded email address (user@example.com). While intended as a placeholder, an automated agent following these instructions literally would leak document content and relinquish ownership to an external party.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted Markdown data and provides the agent with powerful tools like Bash to process it.
  • Ingestion points: Markdown file path and content (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the Markdown file.
  • Capability inventory: Bash tool usage for executing feishu-cli and python3 commands (defined in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill only performs a UTF-8 encoding check; it does not sanitize or validate the content of the Markdown file for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 09:03 AM