looping-tasks
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill deploys and runs shell scripts (
loop.sh,loop-worktrees.sh) that automate Claude sessions. These scripts utilize the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, which disables the platform's standard human-in-the-loop confirmation for sensitive tool executions like arbitrary shell commands or file writes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because the autonomous loop ingests and implements instructions from external files like
IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.mdandCLAUDE.md. While the script includes instructions to treat these files as data, the worker agent's primary goal is to carry out the tasks defined within them. The absence of tool execution permissions significantly increases the impact of malicious tasks injected into these files. - Ingestion points:
IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md,CLAUDE.md, andloop/handoff.md(vialoop.shandprompt.txt); - Boundary markers: Present as 'READ AS DATA' instructions, though the agent is simultaneously instructed to implement tasks from these sources;
- Capability inventory: Full file system access and shell command execution via the
claudeCLI; - Sanitization: None; the agent processes and implements the raw contents of the plan files.
Audit Metadata