bridge-plugin
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and modifies sensitive agent configuration directories, including
.agent/,.claude/,.gemini/, and.github/. It also interacts with the user's home directory (~/.agents/) to manage global lock files and environment-specific configurations. Access to and merging of.mcp.jsonfiles could expose configuration secrets or API keys. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands and Python scripts (
bridge_installer.py,install_all_plugins.py) to manage file symlinking and deployment. It includes instructions for destructive operations such asrm -rf .agents/andnpx skills remove --all -yto clean up the environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by design. It ingests 'rules' and 'commands' from the
plugins/directory and injects them into agent system instruction files (e.g.,CLAUDE.md,.github/copilot-instructions.md). - Ingestion points: Plugin component folders located in
plugins/*/rules/andplugins/*/commands/. - Boundary markers: Employs
<!-- BEGIN RULES -->tags for organizing injected content. - Capability inventory: Uses the
Writetool to modify agent context files and theBashtool to run installation scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the ingested content before it is promoted to the agent's system-level context.
Audit Metadata