fix-issue
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments via the
gh issue viewcommand. \n - Ingestion points: External data enters the context in
SKILL.mdduring the 'Fetch issue' step.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions are used to distinguish issue content from agent instructions, which could allow an attacker to hijack the agent's logic via a malicious issue description.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive shell execution capabilities including
git,gh,npm, and language-specific build tools defined inREFERENCE.md.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the fetched issue content before it is used to derive implementation tasks and acceptance criteria.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
REFERENCE.md, the skill instructs the agent to read.github/workflows/files and execute the discovered commands "verbatim". If a repository contains malicious workflow configurations, the agent will execute those commands on the user's machine without verification.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various high-privilege development tools and scripts (e.g.,npm test,pytest,cargo test). If used on a repository with malicious configuration files (likepackage.jsonscripts), this leads to arbitrary code execution on the local system.
Audit Metadata