ci-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from pull request diffs and comments.
- Ingestion points: PR content is retrieved via
gh pr diffandgh pr viewinSKILL.md(Step 3). - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers (e.g.,
## PR Diff) to separate data but lacks explicit instructions to the agents to ignore potential instructions embedded within the ingested code or comments. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Agenttool for task delegation andBashfor privileged operations likegh apicalls. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the ingested external content is performed before interpolation into prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bashto execute multiple commands using thegh(GitHub CLI) andjqtools for reading PR data and posting reviews. It also references an external script at../../scripts/fetch-pr-comments.sh.
Audit Metadata