mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation harness in
scripts/evaluation.pyand connection utility inscripts/connections.pyallow for arbitrary command execution on the host. TheMCPConnectionStdioclass enables the execution of subprocesses using a command and arguments provided through the script's command-line interface.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill supports interacting with remote MCP servers via SSE and HTTP transports defined inscripts/connections.py. Executing tools provided by untrusted or compromised remote servers can lead to unintended code execution.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Thescripts/evaluation.pyscript contains a surface for indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data from an XML evaluation file (ingestion point) and interpolates the question content directly into the agent's prompt context without boundary markers or sanitization. The agent has significant capabilities including command execution and remote tool calling, which can be exploited if the XML content is malicious.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: TheSKILL.mdfile contains instructions for fetching protocol specifications and SDK documentation frommodelcontextprotocol.ioand official GitHub repositories, which are well-known and trusted sources for this technology.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata