worktree-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Helper scripts are vulnerable to command injection via shell variable interpolation. In
scripts/launch-agent.sh, the use of an unquoted heredoc (cat > "$TEMP_SCRIPT" << SCRIPT) allows for command substitution if variables like$BRANCHor$TASKcontain shell meta-characters. Additionally, theSKILL.mdfile uses the!commandsyntax to execute shell commands likegit statusandcat ~/.claude/worktree-registry.jsonautomatically at skill load time to populate the agent's state. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves generating and executing shell scripts to launch new terminal sessions. It explicitly mandates the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag for these sessions, which enables fully autonomous agent behavior and bypasses standard security prompts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read the
WORKTREE_TASK.mdfile created in each new worktree as specified inSKILL.mdandreference/agent-launching.md. - Boundary markers: The generated
WORKTREE_TASK.mdlacks delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The launched agents are configured with the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, allowing them to perform autonomous file writes and shell execution via theBashtool. - Sanitization: There is no sanitization of the branch names or task descriptions before they are written to the
WORKTREE_TASK.mdfile.
Audit Metadata