fp-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes technical documents provided by the user. Malicious instructions embedded within the source documents (e.g., hidden in comments or metadata) could potentially attempt to influence the agent's extraction and reasoning logic during the briefing generation process.
- Ingestion points: Document content read from the
<doc-path>argument. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured extraction templates and explicit 'Evidence Insufficient' rules, but does not define strict delimiters for the raw input data during the processing phase.
- Capability inventory: Includes file reading, global search, and shell command execution (git, grep, cat) via the Codex tool.
- Sanitization: Implements robust path validation (normalizing paths, rejecting parent directory traversal, and enforcing repository boundaries) and a redaction scan for secrets.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The verification workflow in
references/codex-verify-prompt.mduses themcp__codex__codextool to execute shell commands includinggit status,git diff,cat,grep, andls. These commands are configured to run in aread-onlysandbox with anapproval-policyofnever, which limits the risk of unauthorized system modifications while performing project research and document verification.
Audit Metadata