ml-pipeline-creation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
evaluate.pyscript implementsjoblib.load()to deserialize model files. Sincejoblibuses thepicklemodule internally, it is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution if the model file is malicious or has been tampered with. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves running arbitrary local Python scripts (
preprocess.py,train.py,evaluate.py) specified in a configuration file, which allows for arbitrary code execution within the environment where the agent operates. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data files without adequate safety measures, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from CSV files in
preprocess.pyandtrain.pyviapd.read_csv. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted data from the script logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute scripts and perform extensive file system writes.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of data validation or sanitization before processing the input files.
Audit Metadata