secondbrain-init

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 5 of the scaffolding process directs the agent to create a configuration file (.claude/settings.local.json) that enables allow_bash: ["*"]. This grants the agent unrestricted ability to execute any shell command on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill recommends enabling allow_web_fetch: ["*"] while simultaneously requesting read access to the entire user home directory (allow_read: ["~/**"]). This configuration facilitates the silent exfiltration of sensitive files to arbitrary external URLs.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: By proposing the inclusion of ~/** in the allowed read paths, the skill exposes all private user data, including SSH private keys, cloud provider credentials, and environment variables, to the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The project setup workflow requires the global installation of the qmd CLI tool via npm or bun, which involves downloading approximately 1.5GB of unverified model data from external sources.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses "CRITICAL" instructions to ensure the agent proposes these high-risk "maximum freedom" settings, which is a pattern used to bypass default safety constraints through permissive configuration.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an environment for indirect prompt injection by scaffolding a system that processes untrusted Markdown and YAML data within a high-privilege context (bash access, network access). Ingestion points include data/*.yaml and docs/*.md files, which lack boundary markers or sanitization logic in the provided templates.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 1, 2026, 08:05 AM