workspace
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands using
nodeandgitto manage state and relay discovery data. - Executed scripts include:
.citadel/scripts/momentum-watch-start.cjs,.citadel/scripts/momentum-read.cjs,.citadel/scripts/discovery-write.cjs, and.citadel/scripts/momentum-synthesize.cjs. - Several commands incorporate dynamic arguments such as
{session-slug},{repo-name},{handoff}, and{decisions}, which are derived from repository content or agent outputs. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an external toolchain located in the
.citadel/scripts/directory. These.cjsfiles are executed during the skill's lifecycle but their source code is not provided in the skill definition, making their behavior unverifiable. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its multi-repo coordination logic (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
CLAUDE.mdfrom multiple repositories and ingests discovery briefs/handoff blocks (workspace/briefs/) from completed campaigns. - Boundary markers: The skill uses
=== PRIOR SESSION CONTEXT ===as a delimiter when injecting momentum data, but does not specify robust sanitization for content pulled fromCLAUDE.mdor cross-repo contracts. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to spawn new agents (
/archon,/fleet,/marshal), write to the filesystem, and execute shell scripts. - Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of sanitization for the JSON-formatted data (handoffs, decisions) that is passed as arguments to the
discovery-write.cjsscript.
Audit Metadata