promote-claude-settings
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from
.claude/settings.local.json, which is an untrusted project-local file. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in settings values could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the diffing and confirmation workflow. - Ingestion points: Reads
.claude/settings.local.jsonfrom the current project root (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present to delimit the untrusted JSON content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read from and write to the filesystem, specifically modifying the global
~/.claude/settings.jsonfile. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of setting values for injection patterns is performed, though the skill suggests generalization of paths.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs filesystem operations to read and update sensitive configuration files, including
~/.claude/settings.jsonand.claude/settings.local.json. This capability is used to manage the agent's global configuration and permissions as requested by the user. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README.md provides installation instructions that fetch the skill from the
shihyuho/skillsrepository using thenpx skills addcommand.
Audit Metadata