lark-drive

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Lark documents and user comments while maintaining high-impact capabilities such as file deletion and permission modification, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill retrieves external content through comment listings (lark-drive-reactions.md) and document fetching mechanisms (referenced in lark-drive-add-comment.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not include markers or directives to separate retrieved data from agent instructions or to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive write and delete capabilities, including +delete (file/folder removal), +move (file relocation), and permission.members (permission grants and owner transfers).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of data validation or sanitization before external content is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the lark-cli binary to perform all Drive operations. This includes administrative actions like transfer_owner and permission.members.create, which are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of cloud storage management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 1, 2026, 10:36 AM