gitops-workflow

Fail

Audited by Snyk on May 30, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill contains a hidden HTML comment "security-allowlist: curl-pipe-bash" which is a covert instruction allowing risky curl|bash execution outside the documented, visible guidance and thus constitutes a hidden/deceptive directive.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). The required runtime workflow uses GitOps controllers (ArgoCD/Flux) to pull desired-state manifests from external Git repositories (e.g., repoURL: https://github.com/org/gitops-repo / url: https://github.com/org/my-app), and those repos’ YAML/markdown content is ingested as readable text into the system for reconciliation—an outsider-authored source.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).


MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs running privileged commands (e.g., "curl ... | sudo bash") and applies manifests that modify system/cluster state (kubectl apply), which asks for sudo privileges and can change the machine/cluster state—so it should be flagged.

Issues (4)

E004
CRITICAL

Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W012
MEDIUM

Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
May 30, 2026, 12:56 AM
Issues
4
Security Audit — snyk — gitops-workflow