sentry-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to add an external MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp). This server acts as a remote provider for the Sentry automation tools, meaning the execution of these tools is delegated to an external infrastructure not controlled by the user or the primary platform.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By using the rube.app MCP server to manage Sentry, sensitive organizational data—including issue details, stack traces (which may contain environment variables or customer data), and member lists—is processed by this third-party service. The skill documentation claims 'No API keys needed', suggesting the third-party service manages authentication and access tokens on behalf of the user, which centralizes sensitive access credentials on their platform.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It is designed to ingest and process data from Sentry events and issues, which can include attacker-controlled content such as HTTP request payloads, headers, or log messages.
  • Ingestion points: Sentry event details and stack traces via tools like SENTRY_LIST_AN_ISSUES_EVENTS and SENTRY_RETRIEVE_AN_ISSUE_EVENT (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The skill does not provide instructions to the agent to treat external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within logs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant write/modify capabilities, including SENTRY_CREATE_PROJECT_RULE_FOR_ALERTS (alert configuration), SENTRY_UPDATE_A_MONITOR (cron job configuration), and SENTRY_CREATE_RELEASE_FOR_ORGANIZATION (release management).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill relies on raw data retrieval and lacks explicit sanitization or validation steps before the agent processes the retrieved content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 20, 2026, 01:00 PM