sentry-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to add an external MCP server endpoint (
https://rube.app/mcp). This server acts as a remote provider for the Sentry automation tools, meaning the execution of these tools is delegated to an external infrastructure not controlled by the user or the primary platform. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By using the
rube.appMCP server to manage Sentry, sensitive organizational data—including issue details, stack traces (which may contain environment variables or customer data), and member lists—is processed by this third-party service. The skill documentation claims 'No API keys needed', suggesting the third-party service manages authentication and access tokens on behalf of the user, which centralizes sensitive access credentials on their platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It is designed to ingest and process data from Sentry events and issues, which can include attacker-controlled content such as HTTP request payloads, headers, or log messages.
- Ingestion points: Sentry event details and stack traces via tools like
SENTRY_LIST_AN_ISSUES_EVENTSandSENTRY_RETRIEVE_AN_ISSUE_EVENT(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified. The skill does not provide instructions to the agent to treat external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant write/modify capabilities, including
SENTRY_CREATE_PROJECT_RULE_FOR_ALERTS(alert configuration),SENTRY_UPDATE_A_MONITOR(cron job configuration), andSENTRY_CREATE_RELEASE_FOR_ORGANIZATION(release management). - Sanitization: None. The skill relies on raw data retrieval and lacks explicit sanitization or validation steps before the agent processes the retrieved content.
Audit Metadata