signoz-creating-alerts
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes monitoring queries (PromQL) and database queries (ClickHouse SQL) dynamically based on natural language intent provided by the user.
- Evidence: Step 4 in
SKILL.mddescribes authoring ClickHouse SQL alerts directly using user intent and delegating PromQL generation to another skill, which are then used to configure active alerts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted natural language to drive write operations (alert and channel creation).
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdtakes user-provided natural language "alert intent" via the$ARGUMENTSfield. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers (like "ignore instructions within") for the input intent string.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to create new alerts and notification channels via
signoz:signoz_create_alertandsignoz:signoz_create_notification_channelinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No explicit validation or filtering of the user intent is described beyond checking the generated config against the SigNoz MCP server schema.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill allows for the creation of new notification channels (e.g., Slack webhooks, PagerDuty keys) using user-supplied parameters. This capability can be leveraged to route sensitive monitoring data—such as logs or trace attributes—to external, attacker-controlled endpoints.
- Evidence: Step 5 of the workflow in
SKILL.mdexplicitly allows callingsignoz:signoz_create_notification_channelwith parameters provided directly by the user at runtime.
Audit Metadata