material-retrieve

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and displaying data from external local files which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads from ./writing-workspace/materials/index.json and content files located in ./writing-workspace/materials/entries/{id}.json as defined in the '数据路径' and '执行流程' sections of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions use markdown headers and blockquotes to delimit content but do not include explicit instructions for the agent to disregard or ignore embedded commands found within the retrieved materials.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses standard file system read capabilities to access local workspace data and display it to the user. No high-risk capabilities like subprocess execution or network writes were identified.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the retrieved content is performed; the skill explicitly directs the agent to '保留原文措辞,不做改写' (preserve original wording, do not rewrite).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 9, 2026, 06:58 AM