material-retrieve
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and displaying data from external local files which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from
./writing-workspace/materials/index.jsonand content files located in./writing-workspace/materials/entries/{id}.jsonas defined in the '数据路径' and '执行流程' sections of SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions use markdown headers and blockquotes to delimit content but do not include explicit instructions for the agent to disregard or ignore embedded commands found within the retrieved materials.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses standard file system read capabilities to access local workspace data and display it to the user. No high-risk capabilities like subprocess execution or network writes were identified.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the retrieved content is performed; the skill explicitly directs the agent to '保留原文措辞,不做改写' (preserve original wording, do not rewrite).
Audit Metadata