dify-tool-developer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Remote Code Execution / External Downloads] (HIGH): The skill includes a Python script (
scripts/install_cli.py) that downloads a binary executable fromgithub.com/langgenius/dify-plugin-daemon. The script automatically grants execution permissions and runs the binary viasubprocess.run. Because the repository belongs to an organization not on the pre-approved trusted list, this represents a high-severity RCE risk. - [Privilege Escalation] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/install_cli.pyscript usesos.chmodto make the downloaded binary executable. Granting execution privileges to untrusted external binaries is a significant privilege modification on the local system. - [Permission Bypass] (MEDIUM): The
skill.jsonmetadata declares restricted network access to onlydocs.dify.ai. However, the helper scripts perform unauthorized network operations againstapi.github.comandgithub.comto retrieve version info and binary assets. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill fetches remote markdown documentation from
docs.dify.aiusingscripts/fetch_doc.shto guide the agent's development workflow. This creates a surface where malicious instructions could be injected if the documentation site were compromised. - Ingestion points: Documentation content fetched from
docs.dify.aiinto the agent's execution context. - Boundary markers: None detected; external content is treated as authoritative guide data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for binary execution (
subprocess), file permission modification (chmod), and network requests (curl). - Sanitization: None detected.
- [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill makes extensive use of shell scripts and subprocess calls to manage the local environment, which increases the potential attack surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata