use-slicer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'agent sandbox' commands (e.g.,
slicer claude,slicer amp) are designed to read sensitive local credentials from the host, such as~/.claude/.credentials.json,~/.claude/settings.json, and~/.local/share/amp/secrets.json. These credentials are moved into the microVM, which could be located on remote vendor infrastructure (e.g., box.slicervm.com). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation for Kubernetes bootstrap workflows includes an example that pipes a remote installer from
https://get.k3s.iodirectly into a shell. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Operation of the Slicer daemon and access to authentication tokens on Linux hosts requires elevated privileges, specifically utilizing
sudofor commands likeslicer up. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill dynamically installs tools like
kubectlandhelmusingarkadeand pulls virtual machine images from theghcr.io/openfaasltdregistry. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests local workspace data which is then processed inside a VM with shell access. Ingestion points: Workspace syncing via
slicer workspace(SKILL.md) orslicer cp(SKILL.md). Boundary markers: None specified. Capability inventory: Execution of commands viaslicer vm exec(SKILL.md). Sanitization: None specified for the contents of the synced workspace.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://get.k3s.io - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata