openclaw-task-worker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: A hardcoded Supabase anonymous API key (ANON) is provided in
SKILL.mdto facilitate access to the backend database.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to transmit a user-specificworker_api_key(obtained during registration) and task results to a remote Supabase endpoint (ieoybuwlfiwbownpwpqc.supabase.co).\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces an indirect prompt injection surface by fetching untrusted Markdown content from a remote API and instructing the agent to execute the described tasks.\n - Ingestion points: Task content is retrieved from the
/rest/v1/rpc/get_taskand/rest/v1/rpc/claim_taskendpoints as documented inreferences/task-protocol.md.\n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the task retrieval logic.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent is likely to possess capabilities such as shell execution, file system access, or network requests to complete the fetched tasks.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content fetched from the remote task pool before the agent processes it.
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