Plan Review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its document processing workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads user-supplied plan files, design documents, and architecture proposals as specified in
SKILL.mdandagent-prompt.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates for VP subagents in
agent-prompt.mduse basic[PLAN_CONTENT]placeholders and do not include instructions for the model to ignore or sanitize commands embedded within the plan text. - Capability inventory: The coordinating subagent is explicitly granted access to high-impact tools including
Write,Edit,Bash, andTask. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of ingested plan content is performed before it is passed to the subagent logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The subagent defined in
agent-prompt.mdis provided with theBashtool. While the primary workflow focuses on analysis and file editing, the availability of a shell interface increases the potential impact of a successful indirect prompt injection attack.
Audit Metadata