playwright-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
run-codeandevalcommands allow for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript. Whileevalruns in the browser context,run-codetypically executes in the host's Node.js environment, providing a mechanism to access system resources or perform network operations outside the browser's sandbox. - Evidence: Usage of
playwright-cli run-codeandplaywright-cli evalinSKILL.mdandreferences/running-code.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides tools to harvest sensitive session information, including cookies, localStorage, and sessionStorage. The
state-savecommand captures the complete authentication state to a file, andtracing-startrecords full network logs which often contain sensitive headers and credentials in POST request bodies. - Evidence:
playwright-cli state-save,playwright-cli cookie-list, andplaywright-cli tracing-startinSKILL.mdandreferences/storage-state.md. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
--profileparameter for theopencommand allows the agent to use an existing persistent browser profile from the local disk. This grants access to the user's primary browser data, including saved passwords, history, and active login sessions. - Evidence:
playwright-cli open --profile=/path/to/profileinSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation suggests installing the tool via
npx playwright-cli, which involves downloading and executing a package from the NPM registry at runtime. - Evidence: Local installation instructions in
SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is authorized to use the
playwright-clitool via Bash, which has extensive permissions to read from and write to the local filesystem (e.g., uploading files, saving snapshots, screenshots, and videos). - Evidence:
allowed-toolsconfiguration and commands likeupload,snapshot, andvideo-stopinSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high surface area for indirect prompt injection because its primary function is to process content from external, untrusted websites.
- Ingestion points: Navigating to and reading content from arbitrary URLs via
openandgotocommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between its own instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded in a webpage.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary code execution (
run-code), session data harvesting (state-save), and filesystem writes (screenshot,pdf,video-stop). - Sanitization: None. Webpage content and element attributes are used to drive agent actions without validation or filtering.
Audit Metadata