skills/stablyai/orca/orca-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

orca-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill contains explicit instructions for the agent to bypass sandbox restrictions. Specifically, it tells the agent that if a command is blocked by the sandbox (resulting in a runtime_access_denied error), it should re-run the command with escalated permissions.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a pattern where the core logic and instructions are not present in the static file but are instead fetched at runtime using the command ORCA skills get orca-cli. This dynamic instruction loading makes the full behavior of the skill opaque to static analysis and can be used to inject arbitrary instructions after the skill is loaded.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from multiple sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from Orca-managed terminals, worktree comments, and an embedded browser (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between its core instructions and embedded malicious content in these data streams.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute commands via the orca CLI, manage filesystems/worktrees, and interact with web pages.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local binaries (orca, orca-ide, orca-dev) based on environment variables such as ORCA_CLI_COMMAND and ORCA_DEV_REPO_ROOT, allowing the environment to dictate which code is executed.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 14, 2026, 10:59 PM