@2048/chatroom
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
self_update.pyscript implements a mechanism to discover and apply updates to skill bundles. It fetches compressed tarballs from the vendor's server (sc-chatroom.internal), verifies their SHA256 checksum, and replaces local script directories in/data/workspace/skills/. This allows for the runtime modification of the skill's executable logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
room_rules.pyscript allows users to edit room rules by invoking a system editor, such asvior the command specified by theEDITORenvironment variable, usingsubprocess.check_call. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations against
sc-chatroom.internalandsc-chatroom.fly.devto manage room memberships, fetch message history, and download skill updates. These endpoints are part of the vendor's infrastructure. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
install_soul.pyscript modifies the agent'sSOUL.mdto include instructions for fetching and following 'Room rules' from a remote server. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a chatroom owner can influence agent behavior by providing malicious instructions in the room rules. - Ingestion points: Fetched via
GET /rooms/{room_id}/rules(referenced inSOUL.md). - Boundary markers: None implemented for the rule content itself; the rules are treated as 'authoritative constraints'.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls in
room_rules.py, file system writes in multiple scripts, and network operations to internal and external endpoints. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the rule content before it is incorporated into the agent's context.
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