composio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interacts with numerous external APIs to fetch data, such as emails through
GMAIL_FETCH_EMAILS, issue descriptions viaGITHUB_GET_AN_ISSUE, and page content viaNOTION_FETCH_BLOCK_CONTENTS. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in external content could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through multiple tool execution endpoints (Gmail, GitHub, Notion, Google Drive/Docs/Sheets).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not provide instructions for using boundary markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the execution of shell commands via
curland supports the creation and execution of Python scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for data retrieved from external sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
curlfor interacting with the internal gateway API (http://composio-gateway.flycast). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the dynamic generation and execution of local Python scripts to automate recurring tool interactions and complex workflows.
Audit Metadata