multi-cli-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external targets (code, skills, artifacts) which may contain malicious instructions. The instructions explicitly mitigate this risk by defining a 'reviewer-only' boundary where findings are treated as evidence rather than execution instructions, and by strictly prohibiting the reviewer from editing code or advancing workflow states independently.
- Ingestion points: Ingests external artifacts via
[target-path]and review instructions via<issue-description>as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Uses a structured markdown report format with a required YAML frontmatter to separate metadata from findings.
- Capability inventory: Limited to reading local target files and writing a single markdown report. No network access, subprocess execution, or directory creation capabilities are granted to the reviewer.
- Sanitization: Instructions require the agent to mark uncertain findings as such and to keep observations separate from proposed fix directions to prevent automated obedience to embedded suggestions.
- [SAFE]: The skill enforces a strict path resolution contract, requiring all relative paths to resolve against the active project root and explicitly forbidding access to system-level directories such as
/tmpor the user's home directory. - [SAFE]: The protocol follows least-privilege principles by delegating directory creation and orchestration to an upstream coordinator, preventing the agent from performing unauthorized filesystem modifications or silent file overwrites.
Audit Metadata