openclaw-relay
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/openclaw_relay.pyutilizessubprocess.runto execute local commands such asnodeandpnpm. This is the primary method for interacting with the local OpenClaw and ACPX environments. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a remote transport feature using
sshto execute commands on a remote host (defaulting tomac-studio). This capability is documented as a way to reach OpenClaw agents on different machines. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is configured to access a sensitive authentication token at
~/.openclaw/gateway.token. This token is required by the underlying OpenClaw system to authorize the relay operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it relays user-provided text to external sessions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
--messageand--textarguments inscripts/openclaw_relay.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses basic JSON formatting for results but lacks explicit instructions to downstream sessions to ignore embedded commands within the relayed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands locally and remotely via
subprocess.runacross all relay functions. - Sanitization: User input is sanitized using
shlex.quote()before being interpolated into shell commands, which effectively prevents direct command injection on the host running the script.
Audit Metadata