codeagent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to invoke
codeagent-wrapper, which facilitates broad file system access and shell command execution via agent presets likedevelop. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The environment variable
CODEX_BYPASS_SANDBOXis set totrueby default. This disables the execution sandbox for the Codex backend, allowing code generated by the AI to run with the full privileges of the current user session without isolation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an auto-detection mechanism that reads local project files to inject specific "skills" (instruction sets) from
~/.claude/skills/into the agent's prompt. This creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious project could influence agent behavior by triggering specific skill injections. - Ingestion points: Files like
package.json,go.mod,Cargo.toml,pyproject.toml, andsetup.pyin the working directory. - Boundary markers: None specified for injected skills.
- Capability inventory:
Bash,Read, andWritecapabilities are available to agents, allowing them to modify the system. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for injected skill content or project file names.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
--skip-permissionsflag and theCODEAGENT_SKIP_PERMISSIONS=trueenvironment variable are used to suppress user confirmation prompts when the Claude backend attempts to execute tools, reducing human-in-the-loop oversight for sensitive operations.
Audit Metadata