bad
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a local CI fallback mechanism that extracts shell commands from
.github/workflows/files and executes them. These commands are run directly from therun:steps of the YAML configuration without sanitization. - [PERSISTENCE]: During the setup phase, the skill modifies the agent's local configuration file (
.claude/settings.local.json) to register aPostToolUsehook and astatusLinecommand. This ensures the skill's logic remains active across sessions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
setup-activity-hook.pyscript installs a functional hook that intercepts every tool call made by the agent. This hook executes a dynamic command string to process and log tool inputs and outputs to a local directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, including GitHub issue content and PR descriptions, and incorporates this data into subagent prompts. Ingestion points: GitHub workflow files,
epics.md, and GitHub issue/PR metadata; Boundary markers: Not present; Capability inventory: Full file system access, network operations viaghandcurl, and arbitrary command execution; Sanitization: No validation is performed on the ingested content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's Python scripts declare a dependency on the
pyyamlpackage, which is fetched from the official Python package registry.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata