brainstorm

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command (uv run recall.py) using a query derived from user input. The command template uses double quotes ("<QUERY>") without providing instructions for shell escaping, making it vulnerable to shell breakout and command injection if a user provides input containing quotes or shell metacharacters.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill directly interpolates user arguments into its main instruction prompt via the $ARGUMENTS placeholder, creating a surface for direct prompt injection where an attacker could attempt to hijack the agent's logic.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its knowledge retrieval mechanism:
  • Ingestion points: Output from the recall.py script is ingested into the agent context in Step 0 (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to isolate or treat external data as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write local files (spec.md), execute shell commands (uv), and manage GitHub repositories (gh CLI).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or sanitization of the content retrieved from the knowledge base before it is used to influence the agent's actions.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's integration with the GitHub CLI (gh repo create) provides a high-privilege path for data movement. If the agent is compromised via injection, this capability could be used to exfiltrate local files or secrets to an external repository.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 5, 2026, 09:05 AM