skills/stolinski/s-stack/sentry-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sentry-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download the Sentry CLI installation script from https://cli.sentry.dev/install, which is an official domain for the well-known Sentry service.
  • Evidence: Found in SKILL.md and references/COMMAND_PATTERNS.md.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of a remote shell script via a pipe to bash for tool installation.
  • Evidence: curl https://cli.sentry.dev/install -fsS | bash in SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data from Sentry environments (such as issue titles, error messages, and log content) which could potentially contain malicious instructions targeting the agent.
  • Ingestion Points: Data enters the context through commands like sentry issue list, sentry log list, sentry event view, and sentry trace view (multiple reference files).
  • Boundary Markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or specific warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the retrieved Sentry data.
  • Capability Inventory: The agent has the ability to perform network operations, file system configuration modifications (via .sentryclirc), and destructive actions like sentry project delete or sentry issue archive (as documented in references/project.md and references/issue.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization of the Sentry API responses before they are processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.sentry.dev/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 4, 2026, 11:09 PM