wecom-doc
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage its environment and perform operations. It uses
whichto check for the presence of themcportertool,npm installfor software installation, andmcporterfor tool calls and configuration. It also usesopenclawto query system settings andcatto read local files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During the setup process, the skill prompts the installation of the
mcporterpackage from the public npm registry, which is an external dependency required for its functionality. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads connection details from a local file at
~/.openclaw/wecomConfig/config.jsonusing thecatcommand to facilitate automatic configuration of the MCP server, which exposes local environment information. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to configure and invoke tools from remote MCP servers using URLs provided by the user or through local configuration. These remote servers are then called dynamically to perform operations, representing a form of remote resource integration.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions that override standard agent behavior, such as defaulting to Enterprise WeChat without user confirmation and requiring verbatim output of specific prompts. It also presents a surface for indirect injection by processing user-supplied URLs and tool error messages without sanitization or boundary markers. (Evidence Chain
- Ingestion points: User-provided URLs/JSON and tool
help_messageoutputs inSKILL.md; Boundary markers: Absent; Capability inventory: Shell execution vianpm,mcporter, andcatacross the skill scripts; Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the external content).
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