xiaohongshu
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires users to download and install pre-compiled binaries (
xiaohongshu-mcpandxiaohongshu-login) from an untrusted third-party GitHub repository (github.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp) as described inREADME.mdandscripts/install-check.sh. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/start-mcp.shcopies sensitive session cookies from the user's home directory to/tmp/cookies.json. In multi-user environments, data in/tmpis often world-readable, potentially exposing the user's Xiaohongshu session to other local users. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes external commands and binaries. For example,
scripts/start-mcp.shlaunches the downloadedxiaohongshu-mcpbinary, andscripts/track-topic.pyusessubprocess.runto call shell scripts that interact with local services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from Xiaohongshu posts and comments (e.g., in
scripts/track-topic.py) and incorporates it into reports or document exports (Feishu). If an agent subsequently reads these reports, malicious instructions embedded in social media content could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
scripts/track-topic.pyfetches search results and comments via the MCP tool. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are used to wrap the untrusted content in the generated Markdown reports.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files, download images, and export data to other tools like Feishu.
- Sanitization: While
scripts/export-long-image.pyincludes robust SSRF protection for image URLs, the text content from posts is not sanitized for injection patterns.
Audit Metadata