journey-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches remote data from a specific GitHub Gist (ID:
84a5c108d5742c850704a5088a3f4cbf) using thegh gist viewcommand. This content is used to populate instructions for a sub-agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator performs various shell operations including file deletion (
rm), monitoring log files (tail,grep), and process termination (pkill). It specifically targetsxcodebuildprocesses to enforce timing constraints during automated tests. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting data from external and untrusted sources:
- Ingestion points: Reads requirements from
spec.md(local file) and instructions from a remote GitHub Gist (ID:84a5c108d5742c850704a5088a3f4cbf). - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating the content of the Gist or specification files into the agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands and invoke other skills (such as
autocraft:refine-journey), which could be exploited if malicious instructions are successfully injected into the context. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, escaping, or filtering of the content retrieved from the Gist or the specification file before it is processed and included in prompts.
Audit Metadata