refine-journey

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically detects build systems (npm, cargo, swift, etc.) and executes associated shell commands to build the project and run UI/unit tests. These commands are dynamically determined by the agent while inspecting local files.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Uses the gh gist edit command to write project-derived findings and 'pitfall' patterns to a specific, hardcoded GitHub Gist (ID: 84a5c108d5742c850704a5088a3f4cbf). This facilitates the transfer of project metadata and technical observations to an external, shared destination.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it analyzes untrusted project data to update its core logic.\n
  • Ingestion points: Phase 1 reads spec.md, journey.md, and generated test code from the project root and subdirectories.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or 'ignore' commands to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded inside the files being analyzed.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute shell commands, modify the local AGENTS.md instruction file, and write to an external Gist.\n
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions before they are applied to the skill's persistent configuration files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 05:40 AM