relay-merge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gitandghCLI commands to perform high-privilege actions including merging PRs, pushing commits to remote repositories, and deleting branches. While the code utilizes argument arrays to prevent shell injection, the operational capabilities are significant. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
finalize-run.jsandgate-check.jsscripts include bypass flags such as--skip-reviewand--force-finalize-nonready. These mechanisms allow the agent to intentionally circumvent the required LGTM audit trail, creating a path for merging unreviewed code if the agent is manipulated or safety constraints are bypassed. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. It parses external GitHub PR comments and bodies to determine the state of a run and search for 'LGTM' or 'Verdict' markers. An attacker who can comment on the PR could attempt to inject content designed to spoof the verification logic, although this is partially mitigated by checks for the authorized reviewer's login.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system modifications, specifically appending 'learnings' to
spec/capabilities.mdand moving files in thebacklogdirectory. While it uses structural markers to bound its writes, this capability represents an automated modification of repository documentation based on run outcomes.
Audit Metadata